Russia-Ukraine War and Air Power Theory

In the prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, American intelligence had concluded the impending Russian efforts would succeed. A Department of Defense official reportedly noted that the collapse of Ukraine “might take a few days longer” than the Russians expected, but not much longer. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) was expected to lead the Russian military assault, eliminating Ukraine’s air defense and paving the way for Russian troops to capture Kyiv. However, in hindsight, the expectations were inflated and misinformed. What explains the failure of VKS to acquire and hold air dominance over a much weaker Ukrainian Air Force? I explore three causal factors to understand the failures of the VKS—Ukrainian resolve and innovativeness, Russian culture and its impact on the doctrine and role of VKS in Russian national security, and the role of information and intelligence integration in airpower projection.

Jaganath Sankaran is an assistant professor in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin and a non-resident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He works on problems at the intersection of international security and science & technology. He has published in International Security, Contemporary Security Policy, Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of East Asian Studies, Asian Security, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Arms Control Today, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and other outlets. The RAND Corporation and the Stimson Center have also published his research. He has served on study groups of the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) and the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs examining missile defenses and strategic stability.