NATO Cohesion After Ukraine: How the Shock of Invasion Changed the Alliance

Debates on cohesion in the world’s most powerful alliance have largely overlooked NATO’s complex constellation of internal politics - instead overly focusing on US influence. While the US undoubtedly retains it outsized role in NATO, security scholarship offers few clues as to how or why Russia’s full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine has affected NATO cohesion. Policymakers and pundits were quick to predict a long-lasting “NATO revival”, however, the aftermath has been a mixed bag: achievements (e.g. Swedish accession, augmented force posture) and setbacks (e.g. EU-NATO coordination on Ukraine, Russia-PRC responses, etc.). In this study, I argue that observed variation in NATO cohesion can best be explained by policymakers’ repeated use of internal, sticky narratives about other Allies’, which limit the number of issue areas on which formal agreements can occur. Even when Allies’ interests align, such pre-determined labeling of some Allies as spoilers and others as champions on specific issues constrains Allies’ outreach to one another. To test this narrative-focused argument, I conduct a discourse analysis of high-level, formally-agreed NATO documents (e.g. Strategic Concept, Communiqués and other NATO Summit “deliverables”), which are the products of months of intense negotiations, and leaders’ public statements immediately preceding and following the invasion. I also draw on interview evidence from several officials who were part of negotiations during this period. The study advances security scholarship by offering a new argument for why NATO cohesion has changed in the ways that it has, offers an explanation for observed disunity and updates negotiations literatures to stress the power of outgoing knowledge on coalition politics. The study’s empirical evidence also reveals that policymakers’ national narratives can both increase or decrease cohesion, depending on these narratives – even when the narratives themselves mischaracterize Allies’ actual bargaining space. The research advances existing security studies that find that individuals – and not just states – can play critical roles in alliance decision-making.

Prof. Heidi Hardt is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. As a 2021-2022 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs TIRS fellow, she served the State Department (NATO Desk), a senator and congresswoman. She has authored articles, chapters and two books: NATO’s Lessons in Crisis: Institutional Memory in International Organization (Oxford, 2018) and Time to React: The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response (Oxford, 2014). Hardt examines transatlantic and European security, NATO, multilateral military operations, climate security, organizational change, learning, gender and elite decision-making. The NSF, Fulbright, NATO and Carnegie have funded her research.